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elusion that, under the circumstances there shown, if those
facts now can be accepted as true, the conviction of James
was in clear violation of his constitutional rights and he is
entitled to have it set aside.
However, I see no reason for here referring to the law
which would be applicable in the event that James is tried and
convicted of manslaughter. That is a contingency which has
nothing to do with the decision in the present proceeding.

[L. A.

~o.

21949.
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Jan. 25, 1952.]

WARREN COVERSTONE, a Minor, etc., Appellant, v.
L. N. DAVIES, Individually and as Deputy Sheriff, etc.,
et al., Respondents.
[L. A. No. 21950.

In Bank.

Jan. 25, 1952.]

WII1LIAM L. MOCK, a Minor, etc., Appellant, v. L. N.
DAVIES, Individually and as Deputy Sheriff, etc., et al.,
Respondents.
[L. A. No. 21951.

In Bank.

Jan. 25, 1952.]

ROLLA D. MOCK et al., Appellants, v. L. N. DAVIES, Individually and as Deputy Sheriff, etc., et al., Respondents.
[1] False Imprisonment-Questions of Law and Fact.-Presump-

tion of illegality of an arrest arising on allegations of
arrest without a warrant and a subsequent confinement cannot warrant submission of a cause to jury where the evidence demonstrates the legality of the arrest as having
been made for a public offense committed or attempted in
the arresting officers' presence. (Pen. Code, § 836.)
[2] !d.-Arrest Without Warrant in Criminal Cases.-Fact that
plaintiffs arrested without a warrant for unlawful assembly were exonerated in the criminal proceeding has no bearing on the legality of t:1e arrest.
McK. Dig. References: [1] False Imprisonment, § 25; [2] False
Imprisonment, § 6; [3] Breach of the Peace, § 2; [4, 6, 9] Arrest,
§7; [5] Arrest, §12; [7] Arrest, §6; [8] Arrest, §13; [10]
Malicious Prosecution, § 4; [11-15] Privacy; [16] False Imprisonment, § 14; Malicious Prosecution, § 4.
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[3] Breach of the Peace-Unlawful Assembly.-Illeg-al purpose
of group assembled to view a "hot-rod" race renders action
of group knowingly participating- therein an unlawful assembly within the meaning of Pen. Code, § 407.
[4] Arrest-Without Warrant-Offense Committed in Presence
of Arresting Officers.-Officers arriving on the scene where
a group is assembled to view a "hot-rod" race have authority to arrest without a warrant all who are engaged in
commission of the unlawful act, and are entitled to act on
reasonable appearances in determining who are parties to
the offense.
[5a, 5b] Id.- Without Warrant- Probable Cause.- Authorized
peace officers may make an arrest without warrant for a
crime which they have probable cause to believe is being
committed in their presence, although it be a misdemeanor.
(Disapproving language in People v. Pe1·ry, 79 Cal.App.2d
Supp. 906; 180 P.2d 465, and any implication in language
of Ware v. Dunn, 80 Cal.App.2d 936; 183 P.2d 128 .and
Collins v. Owens, 77 Cal.App.2d 713; 176 P.2d 372, insofar
as such language denies application of doctrine of probable
cause to such a situation.)
[6] !d.-Without Warrant-Offense Committed in Presence of
Arresting Officers.-A public offense is committed in the
presence of an officer within the meaning of Pen. Code, § 836,
authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when circumstances
exist which would cause a reasonable person to believe that
a crime has been committed in his presence.
[7] !d.-Without Warrant-Circumstances Justifying.-The utmost that can be exacted of an officer who arrests without
a warrant is that the circumstances shall be such that upon
them alone he would be justified in making a complaint
on which a warrant might issue.
[8] !d.-Making Arrest-Necessity for Warrant.-When an arrest
for a misdemeanor is made on the complaint of one other
than the arresting officer, it is proper to require the securing of a warrant to justify the arrest.
[9] !d.-Without Warrant-Offense Committed in Presence of
Arresting Officers.-A warrant is not required to make an
arrest for a misdemeanor when the officer sees that in all
probability .a public offense i~ · ing committed in his pres[3] What constitutes offense of unlawful assembly, notes, 58
A.L.R., 751; 93 A.L.R., 737. See, also, Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp.,
Breach of the Peace, § 5a; Am.Jur., Riots and Unlawful Assembly, § 3.
[ 4] See Cal.Jur., Arrest, § 3; Am.Jur., Ar!'est, § 24.
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cnce, since to require a warrant in such a situation would
hamper law enforcement officers in their everyday enforcement of the law.
[10] Malicious Prosecution-Against Whom Action Maintainable.
-A cause of action against police officers for maliciously
instituting a criminal proceeding against plaintiffs may not
be maintained where such officers were acting within the
·scope of their authority in making arrests for an offense
which they had reasonable cause to believe was being committed in their presence.
[11] Privacy-Extent and Limitations on Right.-Right of action for invasion of one's privacy may not be maintained
merely because his business has declined as a. result of publicity attendant on his son's arrest and prosecution for a
crime.
[12] !d.-Nature of Right.-'l'he gravamen of the tort of invasion of one's privacy is ordinarily the unwarranted publication by defendant of intimate details of plaintiff's private life.
[13] !d.-Extent and Limitations on Right.-Facts concerning
arrest and prosecution of those charged with violation of
the law are matters of general public interest, and publication of details of such official actions cannot, in the absence of defamatory statements, he actionable.
[14] !d.-Extent and Limitations on Right.-Right of privacy
does not exist in the dissemination of news and news events,
nor: in the discussion of the events of the life of a person
in whom the public has a rightful interest.
[15] !d.-Extent and Limitations on Right.-Right to recover
for invasion of one's privacy will not be allowed where defendant's wrongful act was directed toward a third person and where, only as an incident to that act, is the claim
made that plaintiff's privacy has been violated.
[16] False Imprisonment-Nature of Action: Malicious Prosecution-By Whom Action Maintainable.-Actions for false
arrest and malicious prosecution are personal actions which
do not give rise to a cause of action in anyone other than
t.he person directly aggrieved.

APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. 'l'hurmond Clarke, Judge. Affirmed.
(12] Right of privacy, notes, 138 A.L.R. 22; 168 A.L.R. 446;
14 A.L.R. (2d) 750. See, also, Cal.Jur., Privacy; Am.Jur., Privacy, §§ 2, 5, 9.
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Actions for false arrest, malicious prosecution, assault and
battery, conspiracy, trespass, and invasion of privacy. Judgments of nonsuit affirmed.
C. Paul DuBois and R. D. Mock for Appellants.
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel (Los Angeles), Wm.
E. Lamoreaux, Deputy County Counsel, H. Burton Noble,
City Attorney (Pasadena), Frank L. Kostlan, Assistant City
Attorney, Robert E. Michalski, Deputy City Attorney, Crider,
Runkle & Tilson, Donald Ruppe and Anderson, McPharlin &
Conners for Respondents.
SPENCE, J.-Warren Coverstone and William L. Mock,
by their respective guardians ad litem, brought actions against
the sheriff of Los Angeles County and five of his deputies; the
city manager, chief of police and three police officers of the
city of Pasadena; and their respective sureties; charging
(a) false arrest, (b) malicious prosecution, (c) assault and
battery, and (d) conspiracy and trespass, based upon the
arrest of these plaintiffs and their subsequent trial wherein
they were acquitted. Rolla D. Mock and Velma M. Mock, the
parents of William J_~. Mock, also brought an action against the
same defendants for an alleged violation of their right of
privacy predicated upon the publicity attendant upon the arrest and trial of their son. The three cases were consolidated
for trial. At the close of plaintiffs' cases, nonsuits were
granted as to all defendants on their motions therefor. Plaintiffs have appealed from the judgments entered accordingly.
Plaintiffs contend that the nonsuits were improper because
they had made out prima facie cases against all defendants.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs
and disregarding conflicts, in accordance with the settled rule
in testing the propriety of nonsuits (Lawless v. Calaway, 24
Cal.2d 81, 85 [147 P.2d 604] ; Lashley v. Koerber, 26 Cal.2d
83, 84-85 [156 P.2d 441] ; McCurdy v. Hatfield, 30 Cal.2d 492,
493 [183 P.2d 269] ), we have concluded that plaintiffs' contentions cannot be sustained, and that the judgments of nonsuits were therefore proper.
On January 17, 1947, a group of students from Pasadena
Junior College had gathered near the intersection of Sierra
Madre Boulevard and Sierra Madre Villa in Los Angeles
County. Their purpose was to view a "hot-rod" race. Plaintiffs Warren Coverstone and 'iVilliam Mock were in the group,
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but claimed upon the trial that they did not know that a race
had been proposed or was in progress. Defendants Mansell
and Hoskins, two of the deputy sheriffs involved, arrived on
the scene in a patrol car and ordered the group to stay together. Shortly thereafter these officers were reinforced by
Captain Cook and Deputy Davies of the sheriff's office and
Officer Frakes and two other uniformed officers from the Pasadena City Police .
.At the behest of Officer Frakes, the students were taken into
custody and escorted to the sheriff's .Altadena substation.
There Coverstone and Mock were segregated from the group
because they were over 18 years of age, and were taken to the
city jail by Deputies Mortenson and Knezevich. The youths
were received at the city jail and conducted through the usual
procedure, including booking, photographing, and :fingerprinting. They were searched and their personal belongings were
removed. .After several hours they were released upon their
own recognizance, and their personal belongings were returned.
On January 20, 1947, they were arraigned on a complaint
signed by defendant Davies, which charged violation of Penal
Code, section 407 (unlawful assembly). They pleaded not
guilty, and were subsequently tried on the charge and acquitted.
Plaintiffs contend that the above-recited facts are sufficient
upon which to predicate a cause of action for unlawful arrest,
in that the arrests were made without a warrant and the criminal proceeding terminated in a verdict of not guilty. [1] While
for the purposes of pleading, it has been held that the illegality
of an arrest is presumed upon allegations of an arrest without
a warrant and a subsequent confinement (Kaufman v. Brown,
93 Cal..App.2d 508, 512 [209 P.2d 156]; Mackie v. Ambassador
Hotel & Inv. Corp., 123 Cal..App. 215, 221 [11 P.2d 3]) such
presumption cannot warrant submission of a cause to the jury
where as here the record demonstrates the legality of the arrest. [2] The fact that plaintiffs Coverstone and Mock were
exonerated in the criminal proceeding has no bearing upon
the legality of the arrest. ( Cf. Neves v. Costa, 5 Cal..App. 111,
118 [89 P. 860]; Wilson v. Lottstalot, 85 Cal..App.2d 316, 325
[193 P.2d 127], to the effect that the :finding of guilt in the
subsequent criminal proceeding cannot legalize an arrest unlawful when made. The converse would appear to be equally
true.) Since it is settled that a peace officer may lawfully
make an arrest for a public offense committed or attempted in
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his presence (Pen. Code, § 836), the critical question present@d
in this case is whether the acts done in the presence of the
arresting officer justified the arrests being made without a
warrant.
[3] It is not disputed that the group was assembled to
view a ''hot-rod'' race. Such illegal purpose renders the action of the group knowingly participating therein an unlawful assembly within the meaning of section 407 of the Penal
Code. [4] When the officers arrived upon the scene, they
had the authority to arrest all those engaged in the commission of the m~lawful act, and in our view they were entitled
to act on reasonable appearances in determining who were
parties to the offense. It is patent that the officers acted upon
probable cause in arresting Mock and Coverstone as members
of the unlawful assembly. Such being the case, the arrests
were lawful as being arrests for acts committed in the officers'
presence.
[5a] 'l'hus as was said in Garske v. United States, 1 F.2d
620, 622, a search and seizure case: "It is the well-established
doctrine now throughout the United States that for a crime,
which they have probable cause to believe is being committed
in their presence, though it be a misdemeanor, duly authorized
peace officers may make an arrest without a warrant.'' [6] Or
to state the same proposition in another fashion, a public offense is committed in the presence of an officer within the
meaning of a statute such as Penal Code, § 836, when "circumstances exist that would cause a reasonable person to believe
that a crime has been committed in his presence." (Ryan v.
Conover, 59 Ohio App. 361, 364 [18 N.E.2d 277] .) Such rule,
stated in the one form or the other, is consistently followed
in the federal courts (United States v. Wiggins, 22 F.2d 1001,
1002; Peru v. United States, 4 F.2d 881, 883; United States v.
Stafford, 296 F. 702, 704-705) and in many state courts (State
v. Reynolds, 101 Conn. 224, 229 [125 A. 636] ; Hill v. Day,
168 Kan. 604 [215 P.2d 219, 224] ; Commonwealth v. Chaplin,
307 Ky. 630, 636 [211 S.W.2d 841] ; Giannini v. Garland, 296
Ky. 361, 366 r177 S.W.2d 133] ; Cave v. Cooley, 48 N.M. 478,
481-482 [152 P.2d 886] ; People v. Esposito, 118 Misc. 867,
872 [194 N.Y.S. 326] ; Bock v. City of Cincinnati and
Tapp v. City of Cincinnati, 43 Ohio App. 257, 261-263 [183
N.E. 119], error dismissed, 124 Ohio St. 666, 667 [181 N.E.
879, 888]; Noce v. Ritchie, 109 W.Va. 391, 392 [155 S.E. 127];
State ex rel. Verdis v. Fidelity&; Cas. Co. of New York, 120
W.Va. 593, 597 [199 S.E. 884]; State v. Rigsby, 124 W.Va.
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344, 349-350 [20 S.E.2d 906]). With respect to such misdemeanor as is here involved, the rule is embodied in the common law ofEngland (9 Halsbury's Laws of England § 117,
p. 88) and has found expression in section 142 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts. [7] .As stated in State v. Mullen,
63 Mont. 50, 58 [207 P. 634] : "Whatever else may be said
upon that subject, the utmost that can be exacted of the officer
who arrests without a warrant is that the circumstances shall
be such that upon them alone he would be justified in making
a complaint upon which a warrant might issue."
[5b] Plaintiffs, however, cite and rely upon language in
certain California cases to the effect that the doctrine of probable cause is inapplicable to arrests without a warrant in cases
of misdemeanor. (Ware v. Dunn, 80 Cal..App.2d 936, 943
(183 P.2d 128] ; Collins v. Owens, 77 Cal..App.2d 713, 718
[176 P.2d 372]; People v. Perry, 79 Cal.App.2d Supp. 906,
908-909 (180 P.2d 465] .) The Ware and Collins cases involved
situations in which the arrests were made upon the complaint
of others. The facts indicated that no offense had been committed in the presence of the arresting officers. The facts in
the Perry case, on the other hand, appear to be somewhat
similar to those presented here, although it does not appear
whether the officer was justified in making any arrest under
the circumstances, let alone the arrest in question. However,
we deem the language of the Perry case, and any implication
in the language of the other cases, to be incorrect insofar as
such language denies the application of the doctrine of probable cause to a situation in which an officer makes an arrest
for acts done within his presence, which acts would cause a
reasonable person to conclude that a public offense is being
committed by the person who is arrested.
[8] When an arrest for a misdemeanor is made upon the
complaint of one other than the arresting officer, it is proper
to require the securing of a warrant to justify the arrest.
(Ware v. Dunn, supra, 80 Cal ..App.2d 936.) [9] However,
to make the same requirement, when the officer sees that in
all probability a public offense is being committed in his
presence, would be to hamper law enforcement officers in their
everyday enforcement of the law. Peace officers would be
reluctant to make arrests for fear that they would be held
liable for having made an honest and reasonable mistake. It
is thus manifest that the day-to-day problems of law enforce38 C.2d-11
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ment require that peace officers be allowed to act without fear
of being held liable upon the facts as they see them, provided
such facts would lead a reasonable person to conclude that
he was witnessing the commission of a public offense by the
person arrested.
[10] Plaintiffs next contend that the facts sustain a cause
of action against Captain Cook and Deputy Davies of the Los
Angeles county sheriff's office for maliciously instituting the
criminal proceeding against plaintiffs Mock and Coverstone.
However, it is not contended, nor could it be contended upon
the record as here presented, that defendants were acting outside the scope of their authority. Such being the case, the
principles announced in WMte v. Towers, 37 Cal.2d 727 [235
P.2d 209], are applicable, and the record does not sustain a
cause of action on that theory.
Inasmuch as the asserted causes of action for trespass, assault and battery, and conspiracy are dependent upon the unlawfulness of the arrest or the subsequent prosecution, it is
patent that these plaintiffs, having failed to establish prima
facie cases on the theories of false imprisonment or malicious
prosecution, cannot prevail upon the other theories.
Finally, the parents of William Mock contend that defendants are liable for the damages caused them, apart from those
caused their son, on the theory that their right of privacy
has been violated. 'rhere is evidence to show that Mr. Mock is,
and was at the time in question, an attorney, licensed to practice in Iowa, and a certified public accountant, licensed to practice in California; that on January 17, 1947, he had a flourishing practice in Pasadena; that the publicity attendant upon
his son's arrest and prosecution caused the business to decline,
and caused friends to shun the Mocks; that ultimately, Mock
was forced to abandon his practice in Pasadena and return
to Des Moines, Iowa, where he is presently practicing; and
that in addition to his business losses, Mock paid $500 in
attorney's fees and $111 in incidental costs of investigation
necessary in the defense of his son.
[11] While the right of action for the invasion of one's
privacy is recognized in California (Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal.
App. 285, 289-291 [297 P. 91] ; Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios,
Inc., 53 Cal.App.2d 207, 210 [127 P.2d 577]; Metter v. Los
Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal.App.2d 304, 309 [95 P.2d 491] ),
it is clear that the principles which govern the right to recover
on such theory do not encompass the facts asserted herein.
(See Melvin v. Reid, supra, 112 Cal.App. 285, 290.) [12] The
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gravamen of the tort is ordinarily the unwarranted publication by defendant of intimate details of plaintiff's private life.
(See annos. 138 A.L.R. 22; 168 A.L.R. 446.)
[13] In the instant case there is no such unwarranted publication by defendants of intimate details of plaintiffs' private
lives. Even if it be assumed that defendants were the legal
cause of the publicity concerning the arrest and subsequent
prosecution of plaintiffs' son, the conclusion is inescapable
that such publicity was not of such nature as to give rise to
a cause of action in plaintiffs. The facts concerning the arrest
and prosecution of those charged with violation of the law are
matters of general public interest. Therefore the publication
of details of such official actions cannot, in the absence of defamatory statements, be actionable. (Metter v. Los Angeles
Examiner, stlpra, 35 Cal.App.2d 304.) The last cited case is
peculiarly pertinent to the issue presented herein. In that
case, plaintiff's wife had committed suicide in a rather bizarre
manner. Defendant newspaper had published an account
of the tragedy together with pictures of her and the building
from which she had plunged to her death. Plaintiff was mentioned only as her husband and was quoted as to the circumstances surrounding her suicide. It was held that plaintiff
had suffered no actionable invasion of his privacy, the court
stating: ''There are times, however, when one, whether willingly or not, becomes an actor in an occurrence of public or
general interest. When this takes place he emerges from his
seclusion, and it is not an invasion of his right of privacy to
publish his photograph with an account of such occurrence.''
(35 Cal.App.2d 304, 309.) [14] Further, as pointed out in
Melvin v. Reid, s·upra, 112 Cal.App. 285, 290, the right of privacy does not exist ''in the dissemination of news and news
events, nor in the discussion of events of the life of a person in
whom the public has a rightful interest. . . . ''
[15] So far as the briefs and independent research have
revealed, there have been no instances wherein courts have
allowed recovery on this theory, where defendant's alleged
wrongful act was directed toward a third person, and only as
an incident to that act was it claimed that plaintiff's privacy
had been invaded. Neither reason nor authority indicates
that there should.be an extension of liability to cover such a
situation. Such a rule would open the courts to persons whose
only relation to the asserted wrong is that they are related
to the victim of the wrongdoer and were therefore brought
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unwillingly into the limelight. Every defamation, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution would then be an actionable invasion of the privacy of the relatives of the victim.
[16] It is thus apparent, as defendants maintain, that
there is no need in this case to depart from the established
rule that actions for false arrest and malicious prosecution
are personal actions which do not give rise to a cause of action
in anyone other than the person directly aggrieved. ( 34 Am.
Jur. § 82, p. 754; 39 Am.Jur. § 75, p. 719; Rogers v. Smith,
17 Ind. 323, 324 [79 Am.Dec. 483] ; Sperier v. Ott, 116 La.
1087, 1089 [41 So. 323].)
The judgments are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, ,J., and 'rraynor, J.,
concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The majority of this court is, apparently, determined that
no action for false arrest, false imprisonment or malicious
prosecution shall lie against anyone connected with the enforcement of the law (see White v. Towers, 37 Cal.2d 727
[235 P.2d 209]). To achieve this result it is, of course, necessary here, as in the White case, to assume certain facts which
do not appear of record. In the White case it was necessary
for the court to assume that the one making the arrest and
filing the charges was a deputy of the Fish and Game Commission. Without this assumption, the defendant there would
have had no authority to make or procure an arrest for an
alleged violation of the Fish and Game Code. In the instant
case, a different assumption is made, but in my opinion, one
on which the affirmance of the judgments of nonsuit rests.
The young men in the instant case were arrested and
charged with a violation of section 407 of the Penal Code.
That section provides that: "Whenever two or more persons
assemble together to do an unlawful act, and separate without
doing or advancing toward it, or do a lawful act in a violent,
boisterous, or tumultuous manner, such assembly is an unlawful assembly." The record shows that a group of students
were gathered near the intersection of two streets in Los Angeles. The record is not so clear as the majority would have
us believe that "their purpose was to view a 'hot-rod' race."
These boys were found not guilty by a jury of the misdemeanor
with which they were charged pnrsuant to the above Penal
Code section. It appears to me that only two implications
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can be drawn from the verdict: That they were not assembled
to do an unlawful act or that the lawful act for which they
were assembled was not being carried forward in a ''violent,
boisterous, or tumultuous manner" as provided in the Penal
Code. It is undisputed that the boys were present together
with a number of other students so that there was an assembly
of two or more persons. It is stated in the majority opinion
that ''Since . . . a peace officer may lawfully made an arrest
for a public offense committed or attempted in his presence
(Pen. Code, § 836), the critical question presented in this case
is whether the acts done in the presence of the arresting officer
justified the arrests being made without a warrant.
''It is not disputed that the group was assembled to view a
'hot-rod' race. Such illegal purpose renders the action of the
grmtp knowingly participating therein an unlawful assembly
within the meaning of section 407 of the Penal Code.''
(Italics added.) But the jury, by its verdict, found no illegal
purpose. There is no evidence that these boys participated
in the hot-rod race, or that they even knew that there was going
to be one at that time and place. In People v. Palmer, 76 Cal.
App.2d 679,685 [173 P.2d 680], it was said:" . . . it is well
settled that the question of whether or not a person who is
shown to have been present at the time and place of the commission of a crime has aided and abetted therein is one of fact
for the jury to decide from all the circumstances proved.''
And the jury here returned a verdict of "not guilty." The
mere fact that the boys were present when the officers arrived
does not constitute the existence of such circumstances as
would cause a reasonable person to believe that a crime was
being committed in the presence of the officers so as to warrant
an arrest without a warrant. Under the holding in this case,
an officer could arrest any innocent bystander who unfortunately happened to be passing by the scene of any crime, imprison him, and then say that because he happened to be in
the vicinity, there was probable cause to believe him guilty.
It is specifically provided (Pen. Code, § 836) that a peace
officer may arrest a person, without a warrant ''for a public
offense committed or attempted in his presence.'' These boys
were standing on the bank by the side of the road when they
were arrested. One who is merely a spectator at the scene of
a crime, who does not participate therein, nor aid or abet its
commission, cannot be held as a party to it. (People v. Woodward, 45 Cal. 293 [13 A.m.Rep. 176].)
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It seems that the majority feels that the arrest and imprisonwent were lawful because the boys were assembled at that
particular spot for an illegal purpose. In so doing, the verdict in the criminal case is, by implication, set aside. For there
the verdict showed that there had not been an illegal purpose
in the assemblage of the young people.
So far as the imprisonment is concerned, after the boys
were arrested without a warrant, the plaintiffs' evidence shows
that they were not taken before a magistrate prior to incarcerating them and that there were no orders of commitment,
which conduct of the officers was contrary to sections 145
and 849 of the Penal Code. Retention of prisoners for an
unnecessary period of time without a magistrate's commitment
order, constitutes false imprisonment. (Gomez v. Scanlan, 155
Cal. 528 [102 P. 12].)
There is also evidence in the record from which it could
be found that the complaint was filed by the police officers
against these plaintiffs to avoid the possibility of lawsuits
for false arrest and imprisonment. Mr. Mock, father of one
of the plaintiffs, testified that Captain Cook, one of the defendants here, called him to his office and remarked that
a complaint had not been filed against the boys but that
unless they (the police) were released from liability they
would have to do so to protect themselves. In Franzen v.
Shenk, 192 Cal. 572, 580-583 [221 P. 932], it was said:
''. . . if it appears anywhere during the trial . . . that the
defendant did not actually believe in the guilt of the person
charg·ed with crime, then that fact is an essential element
to be considered in the determination of the question of
whether or not the defendant had probable cause.
'' . . . the same evidence which tends to prove malice may
also, if it indicates a lack of belief on the part of the defendant in the guilt of the plaintiff, tend to prove want of
probable cause . . . . If, on the other hand, in addition to
malice, there was a lack of belief by the defendant in the
guilt of the plaintiff, there was want of probable cause,
despite the existence of facts which would justify the suspicions of a reasonable man in the guilt of the accused.''
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs and disregarding conflicts as this court must do in
testing the propriety of nonsuits, it appears to me that
there was ample evidence from which the jury could have
found that these defendants did not themselves believe that
they ·had either probable cause or reasonable grounds for the
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arrest, imprisonment or prosecution of these plaintiffs. No
officer should be permitted to bring unwarranted, unfounded
charges against any individual for the purpose of rendering himself immune from liability.
I am of the opinion now, as I was when I wrote my dissent in White v. Towers, supra, that the protection of individual rights should be zealously guarded from unwarranted police action and that the privilege of police immunity should not be so extended that it protects any law
enforcement officer who chooses to make an arrest on mere
suspicion or conjecture.
The majority decision in this case is another step in support of the police state philosophy which the majority of
this court has approved and sanctioned in several recent
decisions (see People v. Rochin, 101 Cal.App.2d 140 [225
P.2d1], reversed by U. S. Supreme Court, January 2, 1952,
see Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 [72 S.Ct. 205, 96
L.Ed. - - ] ; White v. Towers, 37 Cal.2d 727 [235 P.2d
209]; People v. Gonzales, 20 Cal.2d 165 [124 P.2d 44] ),
and demonstrates the absurdity of the argument that a person whose rights have been violated by a peace officer may
obtain redress against the offending officer. (People v. Gonzales, 20 Cal.2d 165, 169 [124 P.2d 44] .)
I would reverse the judgment as to all defendants.
SCHAUER, J.-I concur generally in the view of the
law, and in the conclusion stated by Justice Carter.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied February
21, 1952. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted.

